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A B S T R A C T
In 2011 a tsunami over 20 meters high struck Japan’s
northeastern coastline. Along with causing close to 20,000
deaths, it destroyed many buildings, leaving behind a
landscape of ruins. In the years since the disaster, various
groups in Japan have interpreted these ruins as a way to
work through “what went wrong.” Some pointed to local
officials’ failure to properly prepare for the disaster, as well
as the form of economic development that they had
promoted. Others, however, particularly state officials,
argued that the ruins of failed development reveal
something that can be used to stimulate economic recovery
and legitimize further development. Ironically, these groups
mobilized the debris of “progress” to advance progress
itself, complicating theories of recent ruins as
“counter-sites.” This shows that actors can construct and
leverage the truth content of ruins in support of the very
ideologies and processes that caused their ruination in the
first place. [3.11, disaster, governance, materiality,
modernity, ruination, Japan]
O
n a hot summer’s day in 2012, a man in Tōhoku, the
northeastern region of mainland Japan, offered to drive
me to my lodgings. I was heading to Minamisanriku, a
coastal town in Miyagi Prefecture, just south of where he
had a small shop. On our way, he suddenly announced
a detour and headed toward a four-story building a short distance
from the waterfront. As we approached, I saw that only the upper-
most level had windows. On the lower floors, gaping holes with bro-
ken window frames allowed glimpses of what remained of the rav-
aged interior. He said this was a high school; apparently, during the
tsunami that had struck the coastline 12 months earlier, some 50
people had survived by taking refuge on its roof. He drove on but
stopped again and again to show me similar sites—damaged build-
ings, piles of debris, trees dead from saltwater—and told me how
some buildings’ contents had been removed, leaving empty spaces.
Conveying what the disaster meant to him seemed inseparable from
narrating the stories of these ruined places.
At my destination, Minamisanriku’s Shizugawa District, I would
soon encounter the most famous of these devastated buildings: the
ironically named Disaster Prevention Center (see Figure 1). There
are only a few firsthand accounts of what happened there, includ-
ing a book by the town’s mayor at the time, Satō Jin (2014).1 On
March 11, 2011, known today as “3.11,” he was chairing the town
council’s monthly meeting when a violent earthquake struck. The
shaking lasted several minutes. Knowing a tsunami would follow,
he hurried to the Disaster Prevention Center, which housed the ad-
ministration’s Crisis Management Office. When he arrived, Satō got
word that Japan’s Meteorological Agency had estimated the earth-
quake’s magnitude at 7.9 and that it was predicting a tsunami about
six meters high. Satō calculated that the seawalls guarding the wa-
terfront could block one that size. But when wreckage began flowing
AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 7–21, ISSN 0094-0496, online
ISSN 1548-1425. © 2021 The Authors. American Ethnologist published by Wiley
Periodicals LLC on behalf of American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1111/amet.13006
This is an open access article under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not
used for commercial purposes.
American Ethnologist  Volume 48 Number 1 February 2021
Figure 1. The ruins of the Disaster Prevention Center in the town of Minamisanriku, Japan, 2015. (Andrew Littlejohn)
down the river next to the center, he realized that the
tsunami was bigger than expected. He ordered everyone to
the roof. As he ascended, Satō saw a cloud of yellow dust
rising from the direction of the sea. Suddenly, the adjacent
town hall broke apart and smashed into the center. Wa-
ter cascaded over the roof, hurling him into the emergency
staircase.
Satō remembers nothing of almost drowning in the
tsunami. When the water receded from the staircase, he
found that of the 53 people who had been in the building,
only 10 had survived. Unable to climb down, the survivors
spent a freezing night on the roof, huddling for warmth
around a small fire made of wooden debris lit with some-
one’s cigarette lighter. When dawn came, it revealed a land-
scape of devastation. “Roofs, wall coverings, pillars, furni-
ture, signs, nets, buoys, bicycles” (Satō 2014, 43) lay mixed
together among the few structures that still stood. Satō
wrote about how, in the days and weeks that followed, he
was repeatedly assailed by visions of that morning land-
scape. Before the disaster, central Minamisanriku had been
home to buildings—like schools, the hospital, and local
government offices—that represented the town’s moder-
nity; now, in their ruination, they seemed like testaments
to what Satō (2014, 107) called the “terrible mistake” (tai-
hen na shitten) of allowing or encouraging residential de-
velopment in lowlands that were inundated during past
tsunamis.
Critical allegories
Many people in Japan immediately labeled the tsunami a
natural disaster, or tensai. In Satō’s narrative, however, he
portrays it more as an epiphenomenon of history, especially
the history of inappropriate development that created the
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town’s vulnerability. This perspective reflects a critique that
social scientists, including anthropologists, have long been
leveling against geophysical theories of disaster. According
to this critique, catastrophes befall populations that have
been rendered vulnerable to them by social, political, and
economic systems. Accordingly, they are best understood
not as abnormal or extreme events but as manifestations of
existing societal fault lines and development ideologies. As
Oliver-Smith et al. (2016, 20) write, such disasters are “actu-
ally being generated” by the “normalcy” of “long-term mis-
informed development”—such as locating high schools and
crisis-management facilities in areas known to have been
inundated during tsunamis.
In the last decade or so, disaster ethnographers have
examined the ruins of what they label “misguided devel-
opment,” which they criticize for its role in generating
“natural” disasters (Angell 2014; Dawdy 2006, 2010, 2016;
González-Ruibal 2008; Hastrup 2010; Schäfers 2016; Wilford
2008; Xu 2017). Many of these critiques, like the wider lit-
erature on ruination that they form part of, build on the
ideas of Walter Benjamin (1998, 178), who claimed that ru-
ins are the material equivalent of allegories: they are fig-
ures that can be interpreted to reveal deeper truths.2 Mod-
ern ruins, for example, reveal truths hidden by modernist
aesthetics and material-spatial orders. His “allegorical way
of seeing” contemporary ruination underpins a mode of
critique that I call “critical allegory.” This entails interpret-
ing recent ruins to reveal and deconstruct the phenomena
whose failures produced them, along with the suffering they
entail. In both the ethnographic and interdisciplinary lit-
erature, these phenomena are typically capitalism, devel-
opment, and state power. To give one example, Shannon
Dawdy (2006, 720) argues that the ruins left by Hurricane
Katrina disclose the “structures, both fragile and enduring,
that [lay] below” and created the differentiated vulnerability
of the storm’s victims.
Modern ruins function in such narratives as “counter-
sites” (DeSilvey and Edensor 2013, 467), where such
structures manifest and can be challenged. Even when
some conservative or regressive potential is acknowledged,
they remain “too uncanny” to domesticate. Ruination
transforms things representing modernist “dreams of
reason,” like development, into testaments to their sup-
posedly inevitable failure (González-Ruibal 2011, 163). But
as I show in this article, actors with various personal and
political-economic interests, including the Japanese state,
mobilized different ideas about what “truth content” (De-
Silvey and Edensor 2013, 468) was revealed by ruined things
(particularly buildings), thereby resurrecting dreams of
reason in post-tsunami Tōhoku. Although I discuss several
buildings, I focus on Minamisanriku’s Disaster Prevention
Center because it was so iconic and because there was great
controversy surrounding it. Certainly, some residents saw
its destruction as revealing the past faults of modern devel-
opment, but many others, including officials, argued that
the fraught histories that such buildings reveal should be
harnessed in support of further development and progress.
By examining these conflicting positions, we can see how
ruination reveals its “pragmatic functions” (Kahn 2019,
471): how people on the ground and state actors mobilized
critical allegories to reconstruct modes of development and
protection oriented toward the future.
Recent ruins are not straightforward evidence of the
past negations, violence, or inequalities that created con-
temporary geographies (Gordillo 2014, 11). They are, rather,
polysemous sites that can promise or forestall possible fu-
tures (Schäfers 2016, 229), gather new publics, and create
new fault lines. This depends on how they enable people
to articulate critique in relation to different understandings
of what the crisis was that created them (or, in this case,
the disaster). As Janet Roitman (2012) points out, people
use the concept of “crisis” to demarcate past “moments of
truth” when people supposedly made decisions that cre-
ated a negative teleology. By asking and answering the ques-
tion What went wrong? they demand that we break with this
past and thus propose a different future. But “in marking
out a ‘moment of truth’ in this way, certain questions can
be asked while others are foreclosed” (Roitman 2014, 93)—
including the question whether the present state of affairs
results from things going wrong or from normalcy itself. Cri-
sis and disaster, in other words, are “not intrinsic to a system
or the result of a teleology,” but are “rather a distinction that
produces meaning” (93). Ruins are critical sites where such
meaning can be produced because, as Frida Hastrup (2010,
101) argues, once the wave has withdrawn or once the earth
has stopped shaking, “the [disaster] is its consequences.”
The pragmatic functions of ruination are evident in
how various actors in Tōhoku constructed different truths
“revealed” by the center regarding “what went wrong” (or
different critical allegories). These understandings created
diverging critiques, and thus different moral demands for
transcending or overcoming what happened. Some of the
demands played out in ways that revealed past failures, but
most, paradoxically, worked to divert attention from unsus-
tainable development. As a consequence, the ruins of past
dreams of reason are being mobilized to buttress contem-
porary political economies, resulting in ruinous futures for
regions like Tōhoku.
A major driver of this process was officials’ invocation
of coming catastrophes, by which they meant to protect the
region’s prevailing mode of development. Thus, in Japan as
elsewhere, contemporary governance increasingly hinges
on anticipation (Adams, Murphy, and Clarke 2009). Disas-
ters, and especially the threat of their recurrence, play a
crucial role in providing regimes with opportunities to ex-
pand or reinforce their power (Choi 2015, 287). Yet gaps be-
tween people’s everyday anticipatory practices (or “antici-
patory states”) and official futurities often render a regime’s
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authority fragile, as Vivian Choi (2015) has shown in Sri
Lanka. In Tōhoku, officials worried that eroding memories
of the tsunami after 3.11 would produce such a gap, weak-
ening public support for the government’s plans to rebuild
and protect the coastline. Preserving the ruins caused by
the tsunami could counteract this, they suggested, by em-
bedding allegorical objects (the ruins) in people’s daily lives
and thus justifying both more security infrastructure and
more modernist disaster governance. The irony is that this
very infrastructure will likely make more probable a differ-
ent kind of ruination.
In what follows, I elaborate on these claims, drawing
on research conducted for a larger ethnographic project
on how tsunami survivors negotiated Japan’s post-tsunami
reconstruction. This involved more than 16 months’ solo
fieldwork in Minamisanriku and its environs, including an
11-month stint in 2014–15. During this field stay, I soon
learned that the Disaster Prevention Center’s future was a
taboo topic. People often confided their views to me, how-
ever, perhaps because as a white, Western male, I appeared
to be outside what Paul Lewis (2018, 2) calls “local gossip
circles.” Late in my fieldwork, the town held a public consul-
tation on the building’s future. To better understand the full
spectrum of perspectives, I obtained the 664 handwritten,
anonymized submissions via a freedom-of-information re-
quest. Much of the argument that follows is based on what
I found in them, alongside excerpts from my field notes
and interviews. Quotations from the public consultation are
designated “PC,” followed by the document’s official num-
ber (there are no page numbers). All translations are my
own.
Before turning to this material, I first provide a short
historical overview of Tōhoku’s coastal development, be-
fore and after the disaster. The predisaster period produced
the buildings later ruined in the tsunami, but at stake in
the battles over those buildings’ fates were the contours of
the postdisaster future. The next three sections elaborate on
how three broadly defined groups mobilized the Disaster
Prevention Center in grappling with the paradoxes raised
by reconstruction. The first were relatives of those who had
died there, who wanted to erase the building (I refer to them
simply as “relatives of the dead”); the second were residents
seeking to stimulate the economy through disaster tourism;
and the third were officials and consultants promoting re-
building based on public works. I do not imply that these
groups’ views were either discrete or homogenous. For ex-
ample, some relatives of those who died favored retaining
the center. But the correlations were strong enough to war-
rant generalization: although the public consultation was
anonymized, most submissions claiming a connection to
the dead favored demolition. Across the sections that fol-
low, I trace how ruined buildings were transformed over
time from objects revealing multiple, individual traumas to
vehicles of collective memory and, finally, to warnings for
future generations. In concluding, I ask what these trans-
formations reveal about destruction’s evolving pragmatic
functions in an era when governments worldwide are in-
creasingly trying to shield their favored development model
from its ruinous consequences.
Concreting the coastline
Today, Japan’s municipalities are struggling to maintain
the concrete modernity constructed during the latter half
of the 20th century, when many processes characterizing
modernization accelerated or intensified (González-Ruibal
2008, 247). After World War II, a construction boom dramat-
ically transformed rural areas. Historians locate the roots
of this boom in Japan’s colonization of Korea, Taiwan, and
Manchukuo. Many of the engineers involved in building
roads, railways, canals, and bridges abroad became in-
volved in “nation building” (kokudo zukuri) at home (Steele
2017). Despite the US occupation’s restrictions, Japan was
by the mid-1950s producing twice as much concrete as
it had been before the war. Production increased further
thanks to a national plan for “restructuring the Japanese
archipelago” (McCormack 2001), pushing the allocation of
the national budget for public works to 43 percent by 1993
(McCormack 1995). Much of the money went to pork barrel
(reiki yūdō) and ill-conceived development projects in rural
regions, whose municipalities embraced them because they
provided a powerful economic stimulus.
Many projects profoundly altered Japan’s shorelines.
From the mid-1970s to the 1990s, 90 percent of tidal wet-
lands were drained, and half the nation’s coastline was con-
creted over (McCormack 2001). In Tōhoku seawalls were
built after an earthquake near the Chilean coastline trig-
gered a tsunami that struck the region in 1960. This caused
more than 100 deaths and severe damage to Japan’s coastal
properties. When the walls prevented a smaller tsunami
from inundating the region in 1968 after the 7.5 magnitude
Hyūga-nada earthquake, it reinforced the notion that in the
future “there would be no threat of tsunami” (Shuto and
Fujima 2009, 270). This encouraged further development
in coastal towns such as Minamisanriku. Trust in seawalls
explains why the school I visited on my first day was built
in an earlier tsunami’s inundation zone in 1977. It explains
why homes, factories, and shopping arcades were erected
on reclaimed land so close to the ocean, and it explains the
hubris that led the town’s government in 1995 to also locate
its Disaster Prevention Center in an area that had been in-
undated during previous disasters.
As construction proceeded on the center, however,
Japan’s concrete boom was drawing to a close. Eco-
nomic downturn saw public works expenditure halve in
the late 1990s, as a government led by deficit hawk
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Junichiro Koizumi shifted focus—as was reflected in one
of its slogans—“from concrete to people” (Mulgan 2013).
Not all people benefited equally from this shift, which
was characterized by limited decentralization and central-
government austerity. Construction had stimulated the ru-
ral economies, but many people saw its waning, coupled
with the abolition of tax-revenue transfers from the cities,
as the state “cutting off and throwing away” (Love 2013,
114) these areas. Since then, state spending on public works
has continued to fall; in towns like Minamisanriku this has
contributed to economic contraction and led young people
to find work in more prosperous cities, shrinking the local
population. As a result, some of these towns and villages
cannot sustain their aging populations and infrastructures.
Even after the disaster, they were already beginning to re-
semble what Ōguma Eiji (2013) later called “ghost town[s]
covered by the concrete of public works.”
After the 3.11 tsunami, there arose the question of how
to redevelop these towns and protect their residents from
future disasters. This provided certain people within Japan’s
weakened construction state the opportunity to capitalize
on the catastrophe and resurrect public works approaches
to development. For example, Nikai Toshihiro, the former
minister of economy, trade, and industry, argued that “con-
crete protected people’s lives” (Mulgan 2013): the answer
was bigger walls, longer and higher river embankments,
and ever more “hard landscaping.” Shortly after the dis-
aster, the Liberal Democratic Party returned to power and
promised 25 trillion yen toward these efforts, much of it
earmarked for giant seawalls (Ōguma 2013, 1). Many of my
interlocutors believed that the main beneficiaries would
be the five politically connected construction companies—
known as the “general contractors,” or zenecon—that had
built much of the coastline during the previous boom.
Cash-strapped municipalities, however, welcomed the op-
portunity to stimulate their damaged economies by letting
government money trickle down to local contractors.
Despite these immediate benefits, many survivors op-
posed the plans to further concrete the coastline. On the
one hand, they disputed the plans’ rationales. Some argued
that seawalls had not protected anyone on 3.11. Rather, they
had created unforeseen hazards by promoting overdevelop-
ment and obstructing views of the sea. They pointed out
that many residents had not evacuated—and thus died—
because they didn’t see the tsunami or had trusted the in-
frastructure. People also chaffed at the top-down nature of
reconstruction. Rebuilding plans typically claimed that lo-
cal people were leading the recovery, but all too often, ac-
cording to my respondents, it was a process wherein limited
choices “came down” (orite kuru) to them from the prefec-
tural and national government. These choices, focused as
they were on hard infrastructure, neglected other issues that
people cared about, such as how to rebuild economies that
had been suffering even before the tsunami hit.
Nikai Toshihiro’s claim that “concrete protected peo-
ple’s lives” (Mulgan 2013) highlights how, even during this
early postcatastrophe stage, key players were mobilizing the
narrative potential of materiality in their arguments about
what to prioritize in rebuilding. Such arguments intensi-
fied in the years that followed. As the rubble was cleared
away, the ruined structures that remained became increas-
ingly visible, and these buildings, or shells of buildings, be-
came ever more prominent in debates over the politics of
reconstruction. Some residents and government officials
gradually came to advocate preserving many of them, in-
cluding the Disaster Prevention Center. Indeed, outside Mi-
namisanriku, the center came to be heralded as the main
symbol of the disaster itself. But for the relatives of those
who died there, its meanings were more specific and more
personal. It is to these people, and their relationship with
the structure, that I now turn.
“If it hadn’t been there”
In critiques inspired by Benjamin, ruins often reveal or al-
legorize the failures of higher-order processes like moder-
nity, development, and progress. In Minamisanriku and its
environs, however, many of the ruins came to be charac-
terized by more specific, local stories about what happened
there and why. In the school I visited on my first day, for ex-
ample, the roof was habitually locked; when water reached
the fourth floor on 3.11, people could flee higher because
one of the teachers had a master key. By contrast, at an el-
ementary school south of Minamisanriku, 84 teachers and
children died when they fled to part of the grounds des-
ignated as safe but later inundated. These diverging con-
ditions seemed to resist singular narratives. As the mayor
of Sendai, Tōhoku’s capital, said during a committee meet-
ing, ruined structures “all have different circumstances.”
She added, “They are not ‘general’ but ‘specific’ things [and]
what one can read [yomitoru] into [them] varies heavily ac-
cording to one’s knowledge and experiences” (Miyagi-Ken
Shinsai Ikō Yūshikisha Kaigi 2014, 2). Understanding the
roles they played in the politics of reconstruction requires
that we attend first to this specificity and variability.
I began learning what people read into the Disaster Pre-
vention Center early in my fieldwork, when a regular drink-
ing partner living near it asked if he could draw me a picture.
Above a rough outline of the building’s girders, he traced a
number of lines emanating skyward. “These,” he told me,
“are people’s souls rising, like waves of energy. Whenever
I look at the center, I see them.” The 43 people who died
in the building included a woman who continued broad-
casting evacuation warnings even as the wave hit. Most
of the deceased were local government officials, including
her; a few were residents of the surrounding areas who had
believed a building called the Disaster Prevention Center
would surely be safe. In the aftermath, most of their bodies
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were found. Some were never recovered, however, leaving
their families without a sense of closure.
It soon became clear that the latter had a particularly
complicated relationship with the structure. Believing that
the souls of their loved ones remained there, some would
visit to offer prayers at a small, makeshift altar kept scrupu-
lously clean by an elderly resident. Others avoided the cen-
ter. If passing it on an errand, a community organizer told
me over coffee one afternoon, some people would hurry
by, averting their gaze. This was because seeing the build-
ing brought them pain. Their hearts would race and blood
pressure rise, he said. Such feelings are described in the fol-
lowing letter submitted as part of the public consultation:
We who saw the tsunami will never be able to forget.
We lost our houses, lost all of our things. But for those
of us who lost people (our relatives) on top of this,
nothing remains but suffering. . . . Although I can’t see
[redacted] anymore, when I wonder what they felt . . .
When I think how painfully, painfully they must have
suffered while being washed away, my chest seizes up.
. . . When I see [the Disaster Prevention Center], that
day comes back to me. (PC 148)
As this and other letters show, visions of the tsunami
and the friends and relatives people lost would “rise before
their eyes” (me ni ukabu) whenever they saw the building.
This forced them to repeatedly relive the event; the ruin be-
came “the past in the present” (Gordillo 2011, 163), both ev-
idence of the disaster and a remnant of it.
Some people’s suffering was intensified by their belief
that this past had been avoidable. Like ruins elsewhere,
the hollowed-out buildings in Minamisanriku seemed to
disclose “moments of truth” (Roitman 2014, 93), or per-
ceived turning points when decisions were made that af-
fected the contours of the disaster (in this case, who would
live and who would die). Some of these I have already men-
tioned, such as the decision to create hazard maps mark-
ing as safe areas that had previously been inundated (and
whose future inundation was thus foreseeable, as Sendai’s
High Court would rule; Asahi Shimbun 2018). In the case
of the Disaster Prevention Center, most people focused on
choices made by Mayor Satō before the tsunami struck. He
was at fault, some claimed, because he should have evac-
uated staff to higher ground after the earthquake. On two
occasions groups of relatives formally accused him of caus-
ing death by negligence, arguing that “if [he] had ordered
[staff] to flee in the time between the earthquake and the
tsunami’s arrival, surely everyone would have escaped” (PC
167). The police dismissed these claims, citing lack of evi-
dence (Sankei News 2016).
A few people also wrote letters to the consultation pin-
pointing turning points further back in time. Much of the
center’s surroundings had been erected during the post-
war construction boom; the building itself was built at the
boom’s tail end, in 1995. A submission to the public consul-
tation recalls this:
When I think of the deceased, the center itself looks like
a grave, and I feel sick with regret. If the center hadn’t
been in that place . . . People were skeptical of it at the
time, but they built it in a place inundated during the
Chile earthquake and tsunami [in 1960], right next to
a river, knowing that a tsunami’s nature is to move up
rivers. (PC 67)
In contrast to those blaming Satō, this letter suggests a
critique in which the building becomes an allegory of in-
appropriate histories of development—development that
the mayor himself called a “terrible failure.” It recalls Brett
Walker’s (2013, xii) point that the tsunami struck a highly
engineered space: one that directed and channeled the
wave, placing some people more in harm’s way than others
(and thus rendering the disaster not “natural” at all). Trust
in seawalls enabled this development; the same trust also
explains why Satō (2014, 30) did not evacuate: Why worry,
he wrote, when the tsunami “should be within the range
that could be stopped by the seawall?”
But for most of those who identified with relatives of
the dead, reconstruction provided an opportunity to com-
pensate for the failures that the building allegorized, failures
both general and specific. The building had to be demol-
ished because, they believed, it would impede reconstruc-
tion (fukkō no samatage ni naru). “Right now, the town is
buzzing with talk of reconstructing a new town,” one res-
ident wrote. “But if the Disaster Center is left as it is, re-
construction will be meaningless. I want to see the new,
changed streets” (PC 59). Those supporting erasure asked
for a monument to be erected in its place, similar to the
commemorative stones (ireihi) erected in waterfront ham-
lets after the devastating 1933 Shōwa Sanriku tsunami and
the 1960 Chile earthquake and tsunami. This would sup-
plant the building’s negativity with a “symbolic aesthet-
ics,” which “displac[es] the anguish of life with images of
stabilized harmony” (Koepnick 1996, 69). Once the town
was overbuilt with new, changed streets and memorials, the
traumatic event would appear concluded and transcended,
its lethal consequences and survivors’ suffering “once and
for all calculated, listed, and engraved in stone” (Hastrup
2010, 103).
There was a problem, however: some people in the
town were already discussing preserving the center. To en-
sure that this did not happen, relatives seeking the cen-
ter’s demolition intervened in the debate by expressing how
the building made them feel. Initially, they appealed to lo-
cal politicians with whom they had connections. Later, sev-
eral formed a lobby group called Relatives of the Dead for
Disassembly (Kaitai wo Nozomu Izoku no Kai; see Kahoku
Shimpō 2014). In both cases, relatives sought to suspend
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deliberations by appealing to something beyond or before
politics (Jeffery and Candea 2006, 289): the pain that the
center’s allegorical negativity engendered in them. During
interviews with major regional and even national newspa-
pers, a representative called this pain something “we can-
not escape from” (Kahoku Shimpō 2015). A local dignitary
and former mayoral candidate made the gravity of the situ-
ation clear in an interview with a regional newspaper. “The
relatives of the dead are suffering,” he said. “The sadness of
losing your family cannot be healed. . . . They stand before
the stage where it is debated whether to preserve the cen-
ter. The mayor and the town authorities must face them”
(Kahoku Shimpō 2015). Just as crisis narratives evoke moral
demands for better futures, in this rendering the pain that
relatives felt constituted “a moral demand to respond to [its]
expression” (Cavell 2007, xi).
In summary, for many of those related to the 43 people
who died at the Disaster Prevention Center, the building be-
came a “counter-site” (DeSilvey and Edensor 2013, 467). Its
ruination allegorized specific failures of coastal governance,
revealing critical truths about the particular circumstances
that condemned survivors’ loved ones. Most of the relatives
cited recent failures, like Mayor Satō’s alleged dereliction
of duty during the tsunami. A few also cited older prob-
lems, such as the decision to build a crisis-management fa-
cility in an area where previous vulnerability to tsunamis
was no secret. But this did not lead people to retrospectively
condemn draining and developing vulnerable coastal wet-
lands. Rather than rejecting development, many survivors
yearned for “new development” (arata na hatten; PC 419),
reviving postwar promises to urbanize and order coastal
space (Yarrow 2017, 568). Preserving the ruin would not
only condemn them to relive the disaster every time they
lay eyes on it, but it would also demonstrate how the desired
present had not yet arrived. “Although it’s not good to forget
the past,” one letter concludes, “the most important thing
is moving forward, from a today where that past remains, to
tomorrow” (PC 183).
Emphasizing their victimhood, some relatives of the
dead tried to move decisions about the center out of the po-
litical and economic spheres. At first, it seemed they would
succeed. In September 2012 the town council voted to de-
molish the building out of respect for relatives’ feelings. The
next year, Mayor Satō announced he would ask the pre-
fecture to dismantle it. Other survivors, however, sought
to overturn this decision. This led to what Ryo Morimoto
(2012, 266–71) calls “a struggle of interpretants,” during
which “differently registered and re-elaborated memories of
the past” produced counterclaims over what ruination ref-
erenced, what affects this produced, what those affects did
to relatives, and what they could do for Tōhoku’s precarious
economy. Through this struggle, ruined buildings like the
center slowly acquired less personal and more generalized
meanings.
Leaving things as they are
Those favoring preservation knew that they faced an up-
hill struggle, given the views held by many relatives of the
dead and their supporters. They had seen what happened
in the nearby city of Kesennuma, where a fishing trawler
had been swept inland and became iconic because it con-
trasted so surreally with the surrounding streets. Some res-
idents and the local administration had wanted to build a
memorial park around the boat in hopes that it would stim-
ulate tourism. But, to the government’s chagrin, the vessel
was dismantled after a public consultation showed that 68.3
percent of residents favored demolishing it because it made
them remember “that day.” Perhaps because of this, preser-
vationists in Minamisanriku adopted an indirect strategy
premised on shifting the terms of the debate. Instead of
advocating “preservation” (hozon), they supported a pro-
posal that Miyagi Prefecture take control of the center un-
til 2031. They claimed that this would allow residents more
time to deliberate on its fate. Meanwhile, they put forward
other ideas about what and whose experiences the building
revealed.
In 2015, I attended a town council debate on whether
to reverse the earlier demolition recommendation and en-
dorse prefectural control. Both national and local media
were present; some relatives of the dead sat watching the
proceedings. The motion to endorse was sponsored by a
young politician who had been elected after the tsunami
and who had championed the cause of keeping the center
intact. He began his opening speech in a conciliatory tone.
“I am well aware that no small number of relatives of the
dead and other residents desire demolition,” he said, mak-
ing it clear that he had no intention of ignoring these feel-
ings. He continued, “Shouldn’t we stop placing all the bur-
den on relatives, and make this the entire town’s problem?”
As he carried on speaking, his tone became more strident,
and during the fractious debate that followed, he finally
snapped. “The Disaster Prevention Center,” he said, “is not
the exclusive property of relatives of the dead.” Many oth-
ers echoed this language in the public consultation. For ex-
ample: “[The building] belongs to the town, and the towns-
people. I want [the relatives of the dead] not to forget [that]
many died outside the center” (PC 95).
These arguments offered an expanded idea of who had
the most right to identify with the structure (and thus whose
voices mattered most in the debates about its future). But
doing so required altering what the ruination referenced,
replacing individual, personal losses with a more general-
ized, communal sense of loss. The following submission to
the consultation demonstrates this:
[The center] is a place where we can pray for the many
people who died during the disaster. . . . The people
who worked in the hospital, who worked in the care
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home, the fire brigade, those people gave their lives to
protect us. Thanks to them, we were saved. [Unclear]
was not at fault. The fault lay with a disaster so huge
that we couldn’t imagine it. (PC 2)
As this excerpt shows, it was the tsunami that linked
the center to Japan’s other sites of disaster. Although some
of the submission’s text is redacted, the author appears to
contest narratives that yoke the center’s ruination to site-
specific failures of governance or development. Instead, the
author suggests that the state of the center and that of other
ruined buildings derived from a tsunami “so huge that we
couldn’t imagine it.”
In this person’s mind, the event itself figures differently:
it is not a series of individual traumas resulting from specific
turning points but a single, collective experience—and the
tsunami’s excess was itself the catastrophe. In this “blame
the event” (Olson 2000, 278) narrative, the damage wrought
on the building is attributed a more indexical quality. You
can grasp the tsunami’s scale, people said, from how high
its destruction reaches. Similarly, the complete obliteration
of everything but the building’s steel “skeleton” (honegumi)
testified to the wave’s extraordinary force. According to one
letter, the result is that “when you stand in front of that cen-
ter, your eyes look up to the height of the tsunami, [and] you
experience [it] with your body. . . . [The building’s] form ex-
presses everything, without words; people can understand
all about the tsunami’s horror” (PC 204).
Many believed that this horror would endure, ensuring
that coming generations never forgot what happened “that
day.” Thus, in seeking to preserve the building, some resi-
dents sought to shape a future in which the fraught events
of 3.11 would be progressively overcome. If the crisis oc-
curred because the town was struck by a tsunami whose
scale exceeded all expectations, then a better future meant
ensuring that people would never be caught off guard again.
This made preserving ruined things not only thinkable but
imperative. “Conveying the enormity of the damage to fu-
ture generations,” a submission summarized, “necessitates
forms in which [that damage] remains” (PC 129)—like the
Disaster Prevention Center. When coming generations, ig-
norant of the tsunami, stand in front of the building, they
will understand its ferocity and remember those “sacri-
ficed” (gisei ni natta).
Some residents had other reasons for supporting
preservation, however. During my time in Minamisanriku,
I often visited a hamlet on the outskirts of town. When I first
went there, survivors were still burning debris in makeshift
fires by a large, ruined water gate overlooking the water-
front. Behind this, pieces of broken concrete lay toppled
in a marshy pool created by subsidence. During hot sum-
mer nights, I would hear frogs singing in the pool from my
room overlooking the harbor. It was many years before the
hamlet’s rubble was fully cleared, but when I visited in 2020,
the place that I knew had transformed. The water gate had
been disassembled and the frog pool concreted over by new
river embankments. At the inn where I stayed, the propri-
etress told me her business was suffering as reconstruction
wound down and the construction workers left. Her face
crumpled when I asked what she thought of the hamlet’s
new look. “We should have left things as they were [after the
tsunami],” she said. “Then tourists would have come here
to see it.”
Tourists certainly flocked to the Disaster Prevention
Center, which had become a favorite of national media soon
after the disaster. I witnessed this firsthand on the event’s
fourth anniversary, in 2015. Television crews from all the
major networks descended on the plaza surrounding the
building. As they jostled for positioning (see Figure 2), pho-
tographers hovered around the plaza’s outskirts hoping to
snap residents visiting to offer prayers. On normal days,
perhaps because of all the media coverage, tourist bus af-
ter tourist bus would stop by the structure. An astute res-
ident described how the visitors would “look at the cen-
ter, feel the terror of the tsunami, shed tears at the words
of their guides, then buy gifts in the shopping center and
elsewhere, have a meal, stay overnight in the town, and go
home” (PC 76). A local guide summarized to me the con-
clusions that some drew: “If you asked their thoughts on
what to do with the center, I think most people in the shop-
ping mall would favor preservation” because of its magnetic
draw.
The guide’s comment must be understood within the
long-term struggles I described earlier. As with other mu-
nicipalities in Tōhoku, Minamisanriku’s fortunes followed
the decline of public works construction in the early 1990s.
Government efforts to revitalize such areas have never tack-
led the root causes of their depression. Local administra-
tions lack the power, and national government is more in-
vested in promoting the “leaner,” neoliberal economy that
is partially responsible for impoverishing rural Japan. In
lieu of state support or fiscal transfers, policy makers ar-
gue that such areas should mobilize their cultural resources
to boost tourism from urban centers (Love 2013). But be-
cause many regions have overlapping or near-identical tra-
ditions, religious practices, and foodstuffs, this has the un-
intended consequence of locking towns and villages into a
zero-sum game of differentiation, each struggling to mone-
tize its variations on common cultural practices and prod-
ucts. Minamisanriku has been playing this game since be-
fore the tsunami, which is one reason why its rebuilding
strategy has focused so heavily on tourism. Many residents I
spoke to, however, were skeptical that the town could really
distinguish itself. As one told me,
When people talk about tourism in Minamisanriku,
the things they say, it’s always about the same sta-
ples: there’s a beautiful ocean, bountiful nature, and
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Figure 2. In the town of Minamisanriku, Japan, television news crews prepare to broadcast from the plaza in front of the Disaster Prevention Center on
March 11, 2015, the anniversary of the 2011 tsunami. (Andrew Littlejohn)
delicious seafood, that kind of thing. But if we’re talking
about seafood, next door you have Kesennuma, and in
Ishinomaki there’s the number one port in Japan, and
then if you head further south from there, you have the
famous oysters of Matsushima. So, whichever way you
look at it, we’re losing when it comes to produce, losing
when it comes to products.
Against this backdrop, some argued that preserving the
Disaster Prevention Center was “necessary for activating
[kasseika]” the stagnant economy (PC 73) because it would
differentiate Minamisanriku from nearby towns. A few even
claimed that losing the building would be a death knell:
“The name of Minamisanriku will be forgotten, and money
won’t come into the stores” (PC 513).
Most consultation submissions that made preserva-
tionist arguments did not mention such tourism. But the
shift in the center’s meaning to encompass not only past
victims but also “coming generations” favored those who
supported preserving the center for economic reasons. It
would clearly be not just the townsfolk who would come to
gaze on the structure. Recognizing that visitors gravitated
toward the building and the horror it generated, some res-
idents argued for embracing “the opinions of [those] from
outside” (PC 359). A consultant to the prefecture bluntly
acknowledged that “people from the disaster regions don’t
want to see disaster remains . . . but people from outside
want to learn about the disaster, so they come and look”
(Miyagi-Ken Shinsai Ikō Yūshikisha Kaigi 2013, 3). If the
center was “a ruin for humanity, and not the property of
a segment of the deceased” (PC 247), then, morally, their
objections should neither impede it from drawing these
visitors nor occupy a privileged position in debates over its
future.
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The contrast between these positions recalls the ten-
sion that Morimoto (2012) describes between two ways of
responding to a catastrophe’s “excess of signs.” The first,
which he calls trauma, condenses the effects of interpret-
ing these signs inwardly, producing “beings of history” with
divergent, individualized memories (like the relatives of the
dead). The second, culture, re-presents the past by replac-
ing particular contents with generalized ones, generating a
“chain of interpretants outwardly, producing progressively
historical beings with common memory” (Morimoto 2012,
265–70). He argues that struggles between these differing
regimes characterize the postdisaster milieu: by stipulating
the interpretive grounds of signs, they shape what the dis-
aster itself was. These struggles, I suggest, work to situate
ruins at the heart of where crisis and critique coalesce. By
arguing that buildings like the center represent not discrete,
particular failures but the tsunami itself, preservationists
sought to replace narratives of individual disasters with a
common memory of the disaster that they could then use
to ward off future events and, in the case of Minamisanriku,
the town’s current decline.
Comparable cases suggest reasons for skepticism to-
ward this strategy. For example, Le Mentec and Zhang
(2017) have shown how visits to the “earthquake relics site”
in Wenchuan, China, fell as memories of the 2008 disas-
ter receded, calling into question the sustainability of re-
building economies around disaster tourism. Bridget Love
(2013, 121) goes further: “No initiatives of local branding
or heritage renewal,” she writes, “seem adequate to over-
come the demographic and economic decline” that com-
prises the region’s legacy of “uneven development vis-à-vis
Japan’s center.” After 3.11, attempts to realize such renewal
have paradoxically required that survivors continue living
among the ruins of that development—leaving things unre-
constructed, as the inn proprietress said, so that outsiders
would come and see. This might ensure that coming gen-
erations never forget the tsunami, but advocating turning
places into “disaster remains towns” (shinsai ikō no machi)
would, ironically, also justify new policies that further bur-
den the future.
Ruins for the future
Preservationists relocated “what went wrong” not in devel-
opment or bad planning but in the tsunami itself. This mir-
rored efforts by political elites to cast the event as a natural
rather than an anthropogenic disaster (Gill, Slater, and Ste-
ger 2015, 16–18). Unsurprisingly, those pushing a geophysi-
cal explanation included government officials and their ad-
visers who wanted to resume rather than criticize public
works–based development. Although not all preservation-
ists agreed with the officials’ “hard” reconstruction plans,
such officials came to support the preservationist argu-
ment. They believed that keeping ruined things would em-
bed what Morimoto (2012, 267) calls “semiotic arguments”
for greater development in coastal spaces. It was some time,
however, before officials and those advising them recog-
nized this political potential.
In the first two or three months after 3.11, government
actors seemed to view ruined buildings as little more than
a hindrance to recovery. We can discern this from the lan-
guage that they and their contractors used when talking
about damaged buildings and infrastructure. Most telling
is how they collapsed them into a single general category,
“disaster waste” (saigai haikibutsu), which was also used
for smaller, more fragmented items of debris (Ogawa 2015).
The only value that disaster waste had—if any—lay in the
concrete and steel that could be salvaged for reconstruc-
tion. In Minamisanriku alone, contractors burned or recy-
cled more than 664,000 tons of waste in 2012 (Ōta and Endō
2014, 1). This included 36 ruined buildings, among which
were the remains of Shizugawa’s public hospital and fire sta-
tion. The old town literally became raw material for the new.
Yet Shizugawa’s disassembly also brought new anxi-
eties to the fore. Some people claimed that residents would
forget the tsunami if its traces were erased. Memories were
already “weathering” (fūka), they said, drawing direct par-
allels between fading recollection and vanishing ruins and
debris. Academics advising the government were particu-
larly concerned about this, since support for redevelop-
ing the coastline and protecting it with seawalls hinged on
people’s internalizing dominant accounts of what had gone
wrong and thus what policies were needed. Without local
support, plans for reconstruction risked stalling or even fail-
ing. In Miyagi, officials knew that dissent was growing, par-
ticularly toward the construction of seawalls. These trends
highlight how the state’s attempts to use the threat of future
disasters as leverage for its policies sit in tension with citi-
zens’ own practices of anticipating events, and their beliefs
about how to—or even if they should—protect themselves.
“Security articulates differently,” Choi (2015, 300) writes,
within the “material and social conditions in which many
continue to live.” Traces of the tsunami proved useful for
officials because they embedded objects into these condi-
tions that reminded people what had gone wrong and what
might go wrong in the future.
In 2012 several influential bureaucrats and academics
who were concerned about “weathering”—including Ima-
mura Fumihiko, a well-known tsunami modeler and seawall
advocate—convened a working group at Tōhoku University
to discuss preserving ruins in Miyagi. “This catastrophe,”
they wrote in a press release, “will also, as time passes, nec-
essarily recede from people’s consciousness. At that time,
what can continue warning future generations [are] real
things [honmono] showing clearly that ‘the tsunami came
to this place, reached this height’” (3.11 Shinsai Denshō
Kenkyūkai 2012, 1). Anything “bearing traces of the earth-
quake and tsunami” (5), they wrote, could be preserved,
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including toppled buildings; damaged houses; broken sea-
walls; displaced boats, cars, and train carriages; and even
temporary graves.
They eventually released a list of buildings and items,
identified through their own surveys, that they felt had good
prospects for preservation. Instead of “disaster waste,” they
labeled these things shinsai ikō. The most literal transla-
tion is “disaster remains,” understood, according to Mayor
Satō (2014, 222), as “buildings and topographies left be-
hind in the disaster areas.” The phrase’s first recorded use
occurred several months earlier, in the regional newspa-
per Kahoku Shimpō. Cultural sociologist Ogawa Nobuhiko
(2015) hypothesizes that it originated in academic circles
because it resembled Japanese archaeological terminology.
Popularized by the working group at Tōhoku University,
among others, it soon became the default media term for
ruined buildings. By conjoining disaster with remains, the
phrase implies an indexical relationship. Its use in this
context also marked a significant shift in how government
officials—and, later, the public—valued such indexes. As
Ogawa (2015, 75) explains, unlike waste, the first charac-
ter of ikō recalls the intransitive verb remain (nokoru) and
the transitive verb keep (nokosu), producing an easy seman-
tic slippage between “things that remain” and “things that
should be kept.”
Whatever the value of ruined buildings, keeping them
required financial support. This was soon forthcoming as
the state began reevaluating the meaning of ruination. In
November 2013, Japan’s Ministry of Reconstruction decided
it would fund each affected municipality to preserve one
shinsai ikō. Shortly after, the governor of Miyagi Prefecture
announced that he would establish a committee of experts
to visit, evaluate, and rank nine candidates for preservation
in the prefecture, including Minamisanriku’s Disaster Pre-
vention Center. Alongside reviewing these sites, the com-
mittee was tasked with fleshing out the definition of shinsai
ikō (and thus the narrative of “what went wrong” that the
term implied). In a report released in 2015, they set out three
criteria based on the nine structures they had evaluated:
whether it was a building, an object, or a topographical
feature, they wrote, all shinsai ikō must be things showing
“traces of the tsunami”; should be used to offer prayers for
the dead or be useful for preventing and reducing the scope
of future disasters; and must be conserved in situ rather
than removed to a museum or other location (Miyagi-Ken
Shinsai Ikō Yūshikisha Kaigi 2015, 3).
The first criterion expanded the referentiality of ruined
things beyond any single town or hamlet’s experiences,
echoing the argument that the center was a “ruin for hu-
manity” (PC 247). But instead of providing competitive
advantages locally, the preserved things must become
objects whose value “transcends their areas” (chiiki wo
koeru), in the committee’s words. By networking them with
each other, as well as with museums and databases, the
state could minimize differences between individual inter-
pretations of the disaster and promote a more collective
narrative (Morimoto 2012, 267). In this narrative, damage
to particular buildings’ structure, surfaces, and positioning
represented the individual “claw marks” (tsumeato) left
on coastal space by a single tsunami whose violence had
transcended all imaginable boundaries.
Accordingly, there was no need to litigate responsibil-
ity: if the tsunami was beyond expectation, nobody could
be held responsible. Hatamura Yotaro, professor emeritus
of engineering at Tokyo University, explained this in a book
published shortly after the disaster. Instead of blaming peo-
ple for failing to anticipate the unimaginable, he wrote,
we should focus on what “lessons” (kyōkun) the disaster
can teach us (Fisch, forthcoming). Miyagi’s expert commit-
tee adopted the same perspective: ruins provide lessons on
how lives can be protected and risk managed. Most notably,
they demonstrated the need for “a disaster prevention and
reduction mind-set” (Miyagi-Ken Shinsai Ikō Yūshikisha
Kaigi 2015, 3), that is, an anticipatory state that prioritizes
safety through tsunami-resilient town planning. As Ōguma
(2013) notes in his analysis of post-3.11 reconstruction, sim-
ilar claims were used to justify everything from seawall and
embankment construction to moving residents to higher
ground. Rebuilding plans “that allow no leeway for ques-
tions are [being] facilitated and implemented [in the name
of] respect for human life” (Ōguma 2013, 24), he writes.
This recalls the committee’s second criterion: utility for
preventing and mitigating future disasters. Unlike premod-
ern or colonial ruins that manifest more “classical” aesthet-
ics, shinsai ikō had value for elites that did not lie in their
staging modernity’s break from the past (Gordillo 2014, 8)
or in cultivating nostalgia (Steinmetz 2008; Stoler 2013). It
lay, rather, in foreshadowing disasters to come. Certainly,
the sites became an archaeological record of towns that
existed before the tsunami, but more importantly they re-
vealed the fate that would befall people if they rebuilt “the
same houses and towns that will be washed away” (Iokibe
2016, 277) by the next tsunami. The past they display, in
other words, is not even past. It is a possible future, im-
manent in reconstructed landscapes, that might actualize if
residents do not center their lives around risk-management
ideologies premised on anticipating coming catastrophes.
Given how disaster management is embedded in pol-
itics, it is unsurprising that Miyagi Prefecture supported
preserving only those buildings that were already under
its control. Initially, the expert committee believed it could
suggest additional sites, such as Minamisanriku’s privately
owned Takano Hall. In later meetings, however, officials in-
formed them that only buildings proposed by the prefecture
were eligible. Anything requiring alterations to reconstruc-
tion plans, like seawall locations, was also off the table. But
official plans did not require passing over or demolishing
sites that supposedly demonstrated governance failures,
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as in New Orleans (Dawdy 2010) and Sichuan (Xu 2017).
Even places where governance failures had been success-
fully litigated—like the elementary school where many chil-
dren died—would be accepted for preservation. The Disas-
ter Prevention Center was the only building to receive the
committee’s highest grade: its ruination, the committee de-
clared, demonstrated so forcefully the tsunami’s “destruc-
tive force” (hakairyoku) that it should be preserved through
any means possible (Miyagi-Ken Shinsai Ikō Yūshikisha
Kaigi 2015, 225).
In 2015, Mayor Satō announced that there would be a
public consultation on whether the town would accept the
prefecture’s plan to preserve the center until 2031. On June
1, he published the result: almost 60 percent of residents
were in favor. At the end of the month, Satō announced that
the town would reverse its previous demolition order and
hand over temporary control to the prefecture. According to
a pro-preservation activist I spoke to, this was tantamount
to permanent preservation. Today, the center joins a num-
ber of other shinsai ikō across Miyagi, including Okawa El-
ementary School, a police box (kōban), and a ruined rail-
way platform. In neighboring Iwate Prefecture, the ruins of a
broken seawall, which failed to protect residents, have also
been preserved.
Between these nodal sites, gone is the debris that
Mayor Satō gazed at on the morning after the tsunami. On
the land that it had buried sit new industrial zones; in front
of these rise new and higher seawalls, which officials claim
will protect the town. When I last visited in 2020, many
of the seafood-processing operations earmarked to occupy
these zones had already opened, and the local economy
had largely recovered from a more than 60 percent drop
in 2012. But this recovery resulted mostly from the con-
struction boom that benefited local contractors. As recon-
struction winds down, the predisaster recession will likely
resume. More troubling for future revenues is the ongoing
population decline, as people of working age continue to
leave for the cities. Local government figures project a fall
from 14,333 residents in 2014 to as few as 4,360 by 2060—
about the same time the seawalls, built to last some 50 years
without maintenance, will become a new financial burden.
Without a tax base to maintain boom-era con-
struction, ruination appears inevitable for towns like
Minamisanriku—even without another devastating
tsunami. Ironically, as Nagamatsu Shingo (2018) has shown,
greater expenditure on “hard” development coincided with
a steeper rate of population decline; the more public works
there are, we can conclude, the more likely it is that they will
eventually succumb to erosion or abandonment by towns
that cannot maintain them. Many residents, as I have said,
hoped that preserving ruins like the center would help
offset future losses through stimulating disaster tourism.
Yet, while the concept of shinsai ikō is the best hope for
economic revival in rural towns like Minamisanriku, it
is also being used to support a development model that
accelerates these towns’ present and future decline. “At
this rate,” Ōguma (2013, 25) wrote in his survey of coastal
reconstruction, “a ghost town covered by the concrete of
public works may arise” in places like Minamisanriku.
This future is already visible in the growing number of
abandoned houses (akiya) across the town. Of course, even
in such scenarios, “respect for human life”—the justifica-
tion behind public works—will have been served, Ōguma
concludes. “After all, nobody dies in a ghost town” (25).
Conclusion: Building ruins on ruins
In his reflections on Paul Klee’s painting Angelus Novus,
Benjamin (1999, 258) describes modernity as one, ongoing
catastrophe: a “storm called progress,” which propels us
blindly into the future while piling wreckage upon wreckage
behind us. Inspired by his writings, anthropologists have
increasingly focused on interrogating and theorizing this
storm through what it leaves in its wake. “Countless places
the world over,” Gordillo (2011, 158) writes, “are drenched in
debris of progress.” Filtered through Benjamin’s allegorical
way of seeing, this appears to lay bare both development’s
failures and those of other modernist ideologies, under-
mining the latter’s symbolic architecture. Ruins function
in these analytical narratives and theoretical treatises as
critical allegories whose power derives from supposedly
disturbing “attempts to cleanse, banish ambiguity and
order the memory of space” (Edensor 2005, 845).
In contrast to these scholarly analyses, narratives in
Tōhoku mobilized the tsunami’s ruins to support vari-
ous agendas for the region’s recovery and redevelopment.
The results of this complicate the “critically deconstruc-
tive orientation” (Yarrow 2017, 585) that recent ruin stud-
ies bring to their objects. During a debate on the center’s
fate, one town councillor echoed their claims when he said,
“The [building] that stands there speaks no lies.” Such ob-
jects, however, function in polysemous ways, and mobiliz-
ing them requires making them say what we want (Schönle
2006, 652). Depending on their particular experiences and
interests, some residents did so in critically deconstructive
ways, arguing that buildings like the center allegorized spe-
cific failures of governance. But other residents and officials
claimed that “disaster remains” (shinsai ikō) spoke less of
particular failings than of a tsunami whose remaining traces
could support flagging economies and justify progressive
public works. These narratives about “what went wrong”
eclipsed how the present state of affairs derived from mod-
ern Japan’s urban and rural development, which created the
disaster’s conditions of possibility as well as the economic
conditions that made preserving its ruins popular. At the
same time, struggles over the meaning of ruined things not
only revealed the past but also participated in forming new
societal fault lines.
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Other places bearing the residue of past traumas have
seen similar struggles (Dawdy 2006; Low 2004; Xu 2017). In
New York, for example, some wanted to preserve what re-
mained of the World Trade Center, against the wishes of
nearby residents (Sturken 2004, 315). In Sichuan, the Chi-
nese state removed, concealed, or covered any ruins that
disturbed its narrative about the 2008 earthquake (Xu 2017,
488). Today, most of these sites are gone, and what remain
are fragments, like the small piece of wall preserved at Ok-
lahoma City’s otherwise conventional bombing memorial.
Such objects and their treatment might lend credence to
the idea that modern ruins are too personal, too fragile,
and too politically charged for official projects (Dawdy 2010,
774). In post-3.11 Japan, however, the most controversial
objects are now key elements in the disaster region’s sym-
bolic architecture. Since 2011, ruin preservation has spread
in Japan as a political-economic technology. For example,
after a magnitude 7 earthquake struck rural Kumamoto in
2016, the prefecture retained no fewer than 31 ruined build-
ings and topographies to warn future generations and to at-
tract tourists (Kumamoto Prefecture 2019).
In disaster scholarship, reducing risk has been framed
largely as a strategy to protect existing development models
from their negative consequences (e.g., Oliver-Smith 2016,
75), such as rendering coastal populations vulnerable to
tsunamis. Indeed, risk-reduction policies can enable fur-
ther development, as has been the case in Japan. A unique
aspect of how Japan dealt with the postdisaster wreckage
lay in how officials, and some residents, recognized the role
that ruination can play in the temporal and affective politics
of anticipation (Adams, Murphy, and Clarke 2009, 247). The
imperative to reduce risk can also be challenged when gaps
emerge between the anticipatory states of regimes and their
citizens. By helping to close the gap, the disaster remains, or
shinsai ikō, are—paradoxically—being used to protect the
very ideologies that enabled their own and their region’s ru-
ination. As disasters increase in frequency worldwide, we
may well see similar trends outside seismic states like Japan.
The United States, certainly, is no stranger to the idea that
imagined future ruins can be effective political technologies
(Masco 2008). There and elsewhere, those who champion
development may also realize that critical allegories do not
only testify to modernity’s failures: they can also be alibis for
building new ones.
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1. With the exception of published authors and people whose
names and stances are already public (for example, as a result of
media reports), I have anonymized the names of all people and
places within Minamisanriku and the surrounding municipalities.
2. For example, Martin Heidegger (2009, 19) writes that an alle-
gory “makes public something other than itself; it manifests some-
thing other.” On allegory’s relationship to truth, Zahid Chaudhary
(2009, 86) argues that it “seeks to express a truth that might other-
wise be inexpressible. This is its philosophical claim—it speaks the
truth.”
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